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case study
The force initially comprised a dozen members, 
selected on the basis of their capacity to 
remain creative under intense pressure. The 
RRF tested its mettle in the course of two 
exercises, dealing with pandemic and nuclear-
related scenarios (September and October 
respectively) and proved to be not only useful, 
but truly essential for upper-echelon leaders. 
It enabled them to remain focused on their 
strategic role, ie eschew the tendency to be 
swamped by tactical-technical matters and 
micro-management. Through strategic advice, 
as well as very specifi c propositions, the RRF 
provided new traction and leverage in the face 
of situations that typically deny organisations 
any real control over chaotic dynamics. 
In the wake of these two initial exercises, 
the ‘top four’ echelon at EDF confi rmed that 
the RRF had become an ‘essential’ tool, 
and even announced a new policy: “No 
crisis management without the RRF.” 
 I
N 2006, THE AUTHORS LAID OUT A 
new concept for crisis leadership in CRJ 
which Électricité de France (EDF) was then 
just beginning to implement at the highest 
level: the Rapid Refl ection Force (RRF). 
One year on, EDF’s top management now 
systematically relies on it. It has proven to be 
a crucial platform for innovative networking 
dynamics inside and outside EDF, and has 
spurred the company to tackle the challenges 
of chaotic environments that characterise 
21st century crises more effectively. 
POSITIVE DYNAMICS
The RRF is a group that’s task is to help 
the Chief Executive (CE) level grasp and 
confront issues raised by unconventional 
situations. It does so by developing equally 
unconventional responses when usual toolkits 
and references turn out to be irrelevant, or 
indeed dangerous. It aims to raise the right 
questions (rather than rely on ready-made 
answers), to fl ag pitfalls, to clarify new player 
networks, and to identify one (or two) critical 
initiative(s) that can trigger positive dynamics. 
In 2006, EDF implemented the RRF concept. 
Rapid Reﬂ ection Forces 
put to the reality test
Pierre Béroux, Xavier Guilhou, and Patrick Lagadec outline how the Rapid Refl ection 
Force concept – described in CRJ in 2006 – has now proved itself as a pivotal tool for EDF’s 
senior management when they are confronted with risks and crises
outside add-on to organisational coping 
mechanisms, but as an underpinning for EDF’s 
entire crisis management architecture. 
Over a seven-month period, (in August and 
November 2006, and then again in February 
2007), one of EDF’s nuclear plants (Chinon) 
was hit by a cluster of tragic events, as three of 
its employees committed suicide. Though this 
did not happen on the premises of the plant 
itself, this apparent ‘cluster’ mushroomed into 
an internal and public issue, all the more so as 
it had eerie similarities with recent occurrences 
within other French companies, whose initial 
reaction had been to underline that suicide 
was an individual act, which therefore entailed 
no specifi c responsibility from the industry. 
RAISING QUESTIONS
EDF decided immediately to act differently. 
Pierre Béroux, in his capacity as Chief Risk 
Manager, instead raised a fi rst crucial question: 
“What is the essence of the problem?” He 
quickly agreed on a common, basic paradigm 
with the two other authors of this paper (who 
at the time were in New Orleans), and EDF’s 
other members of the RRF. This paradigm 
was to: Avoid an over-hasty or dryly technical 
response; and eschew narrowly legalistic 
postures, which would only have caused 
more disarray and more loss of confi dence. 
The suggestion was made – and accepted 
by the CE level – that the real answer to such 
deep-rooted turbulence was not, in fact, an 
answer, but an attitude; that the company’s 
posture should not be, yet again, top-down or 
magisterial (“let me tell you…”), but should 
demonstrate a willingness to listen, and then 
to act. Specifi cally, a mission was set up 
at the CE level, under the leadership of two 
high-level offi cials – Pierre Béroux, and a 
Human Resources (HR) manager – described 
as personal representatives of the Chairman. 
The principles of complete respect and in-
depth listening were fully endorsed by all. 
The RRF remained involved at all stages of 
the process, working hard to analyse situations, 
open up ideas, and suggest courses of action. 
At the plant, the delegation excluded no one; 
it aimed not to explain, but to listen and try to 
understand. This openness helped clear the 
air which the issue had threatened to poison, 
as employees were given a chance to dwell 
on traditionally ‘taboo’ subjects, such as 
organisational pressure. Just as the problem 
at hand was serious, so it was considered and 
analysed seriously, enabling a global dynamic 
for change, improvement and healing. 
The point here is not to draw a rosy picture 
of the RRF’s work. The types of challenges that 
it is meant to confront do not allow for quick 
fi xes. The ambition is not, or cannot be, to put 
our fi nger on ‘the’ magic formula, but – more 
modestly and more responsibly – to create 
conditions and avenues for improvement. The 
point is not to appear successful, but to be wise. 
This same spirit and method was used 
in another crisis: a risk of regional blackout 
which lasted from December 2006 to 
February 2007, and during a very sensitive 
period, Christmas. The challenge posed by 
this incident, as the RRF underlined, was for 
EDF to rise above a simple ‘name and blame’ 
response and to instead focus on leadership 
and crisis resolution empowerment.
In September 2007, a very ambitious 
simulation exercise was held by EDF, based 
on the scenario of a breakdown in information 
systems. The ‘fog of war’ was very dense 
indeed: it was unclear whether the event was 
due to a national terrorist attack or merely to 
a localised disruption. This raised a serious 
challenge for the CE level, as the appropriate 
posture would differ dramatically depending 
on how the situation was interpreted. The RRF 
proved invaluable in helping the upper echelon 
make sense of the resulting ‘funny war’.
It was essential to weigh both possibilities 
very carefully; no ready-made tool-kit could 
provide a technical answer, or determine 
the appropriate communication strategy. 
The RRF was the fi rst to understand that 
the situation was not a case of global terror, 
but was owing to insuffi cient protection at 
a single site – a conclusion which called 
for a specifi c communication strategy.
In December 2007, a second large-scale 
exercise was organised, involving, this time, 
a (fi ctitious) nuclear incident. EDF had, of 
course, trained on many nuclear-related 
scenarios in the past, but the RRF quickly 
called the top leaders’ attention to the fact 
that here, new dynamics were at play. 
Over the years, EDF had developed a 
habit of tackling such situations initially 
through a technical response (in the very 
fi rst hours), before turning its attention to 
EDF had, of course, trained on many nuclear-related scenarios in the 
past, but the Rapid Refl ection Force large scale exercise organised in 
December last year involving a fi ctitious nuclear incident, quickly called 
the top leaders’ attention to the fact that new dynamics were in play
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One year on, the RRF has matured into more 
than just a promising concept. The learning 
curve has been steep, and the practicalities of 
this innovation have been refi ned. But the RRF 
is much more than an organisational success 
story. More to the point, it has shown itself to 
be a seminal concept in approaching the terra 
incognitae that are modern crises. The RRF 
arguably holds a crucial answer to the question 
raised by the US House of Representatives in 
its report on Hurricane Katrina, namely: “Why 
do we seem to be continuously one disaster 
behind?” It lays the groundwork for a new 
culture, new operational ‘grammars’, and – last 
but not least – new networking capabilities when 
the name of the game is partnership, collective 
innovation and resilience. The new cartography 
of risk and crises that we are called upon to 
develop requires new beacons and charting 
instruments: the RRF is a good place to start. 
In 2007, the RRF was convened on 
several occasions in real life situations 
and in training exercises. The conclusions 
reached in 2006 were upheld, as the RRF 
continued to prove invaluable. So much so, 
in fact, that the RRF is now not seen as an 
public communication (some hours later). 
But now the scenario at hand would clearly 
trigger immediate disruption among the wider 
public: addressing its concerns could not wait 
until technical issues had been resolved. 
More surprisingly, communication itself had 
changed radically. For years, the norm in crisis 
communication had been to prepare the initial 
communiqué, followed by a media briefi ng, 
and high-profi le TV interviews, especially in 
nationally-televised newscasts. Now, however, 
the internet has hanged the rules of the game. 
Again, the RRF was crucial to the response 
as it helped the CE representative and the 
communication team to build a strategic 
response that refl ected the new challenges. 
Generic lessons have emerged from all 
of this. On the one hand, it is now clear 
that the RRF can play a crucial role. But on 
the other hand it cannot, and should not, 
replace other functions: neither operations 
nor communication, nor least of all an 
organisation’s strategic team. This suggests 
where the goalposts are to be set: everyone 
within the crisis platform should be trained 
to take full advantage of the RRF, but they 
must also retain their own crucial mission. 
The reality tests and exercises underlined two 
imperatives. First of all, RRF members should 
undergo new training continually. Crises today 
grow more and more complex and surprising. 
Preparation must adapt in consequence, with 
a crucial warning: “Never fi ght the last war.” 
Unfortunately, ofﬁ cial reports often 
do little more than string together 
a litany of recommendations 
that call for more of the same. 
Such conventional thinking 
is not the way to confront 
emerging risks and crises
This electricity pylon was destroyed by a hurricane. The RRF was 
implemented specifi cally to tackle crises like this more effectively
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sTherefore, a new special training programme 
was created which combines both teaching 
(lessons drawn from recent on-site case studies 
at worldwide level), and simulations confronting 
very difficult and ‘strange’ scenarios.
The second imperative is that each team 
working in the crisis centre should be given 
specific preparation to improve its capacity 
to interact with the RRF. A programme is now 
underway creating an operational tool-kit on 
unthinkable crises, or even conventional crises 
that suddenly mutate into inconceivable events.  
A DVD will be available by this March, 
combining basic texts, slides, and short 
videos aimed at heightening the viewer’s 
awareness of these issues and to prod 
them to modify their approaches. 
In addition, specific sessions for each 
group (operations, communication and 
leadership) should be held to cultivate 
the necessary change in dynamics. 
The key outcome, to date, has been 
a near-universal acknowledgement that 
critical improvements are required. Even 
the best practices developed over the last 
decades must be revisited – and all agree 
that the RRF can help this happen.
Today’s crises tend to overwhelm traditional 
crisis management mechanisms and 
organisational frameworks. In so doing, they 
trigger ‘stun effects’, as even trusted best 
practice becomes outmoded. In this context, 
it is crucial that teams and individuals in 
charge feel that their organisation includes 
a group of people devoted to precisely 
addressing such impossible challenges, 
and available to help where and when 
needed – all the while trusting that their own 
role is not undermined in the process. 
PILLAR OF STRENGTH
Real life incidents and exercises have shown 
that the RRF can genuinely become a pillar 
of strength around which an organisation 
can coalesce. The RRF can benefit all. On a 
global scale, it can help an entire organisation 
develop strength, coherence, stability, and 
strategic intelligence, and thereby address 
the most difficult – and increasingly frequent 
– challenges of our turbulent times. The RRF 
is also a steady driver for benchmarking, 
partnerships, and shared initiatives. 
The crucial issue at stake was underlined 
by the White House Report on Hurricane 
Katrina: “Our current system for homeland 
security does not provide the necessary 
framework to manage the challenges posed 
by 21st century catastrophic threats.”
Our cartography of risks and crises is 
outdated. Our best practice still lags one war 
behind. Unfortunately, official reports often 
do little more than string together a litany of 
recommendations that call for more of the 
same. Such conventional thinking is not the 
way to confront emerging risks and crises. 
Granted, it is now fashionable to call 
for new public-private partnerships, for 
benchmarking, for more communication and 
more simulation exercises. But we are far from 
the conceptual revolution which would turn 
these mantras into more than empty slogans. 
Many people seem vaguely aware that this is 
not enough, that a terra incognita somehow 
lies beyond old and outmoded approaches. 
The RRF is a gateway into this unknown 
area, a new instrument to begin charting 
emerging risks and crises, and the appropriate 
responses. This is because it focuses on 
questions, on creativity, rather than on 
ready-made answers. It calls for, and elicits, 
the sharing of questions, intuitions, and 
open-minded approaches. It concentrates on 
flagging specific ways out, not on the absurd 
ambition to develop global, final answers. 
Those are no longer attainable – if they ever 
were – in today’s chaotic environment. 
This capacity to provide a pillar of strength 
that doubles up as a signpost explains why 
so many officials – private and public, French 
and international – have now expressed 
their interest in the RRF, fully aware that it is 
more than a just another tool, another best 
practice. With increasing frequency, many 
have asked to come and see the RRF at work 
during simulation exercises for themselves. 
The RRF has also proven to be a stimulus for 
high-level meetings on an international scale, 
through its attractiveness as a promising new 
avenue to grasping and confronting emerging 
issues of global import. It was one of the 
focal points of a seminar held by the Johns 
Hopkins University’s Center for Transatlantic 
Relations in Washington, in March 2007, 
and again during the international seminar 
on emerging crises convened by Morocco’s 
government in Casablanca in May of that year. 
The RRF initiative is also the cornerstone of 
another recently launched initiative with critical 
operators (from the banking, transportation, 
telecommunication and water sectors) in 
France, with the aim of setting up a European 
partnership to tackle the most difficult issues 
related to crisis management in a chaotic world. 
In a nutshell, the RRF has shown itself to be 
much more than the organisational add-on to 
crisis cells that had initially been envisioned. 
It is, in fact, a rare lifeline in today’s emerging 
environment of risks and crises. In this sense, it 
has undoubtedly gone far beyond expectations. 
It now behoves us to look forward and build 
upon this cornerstone. In the authors’ opinion, 
the best means to do so is to open new avenues 
for co-operation, be it with academia, experts, 
or leaders, with the crucial support of EDF. 
This article will have fulfilled its objective if 
it brings us any closer to this goal. 
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case study
The EDF crisis room in action during a pandemic crisis exercise. The RRF 
tested its mettle in the course of two exercises, dealing with pandemic and 
nuclear-related scenarios, and proved itself not only to be useful, but truly 
essential for upper-echelon leaders
